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DO-MESTIC RELATIONS-RIGHT OF WIFE TO SUE FOR
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM DUE TO A NEGLIGENT
INJURY TO HER HUSBAND
Any student of the law of domestic relations will note the
lack of uniformity which allows a husband to recover pecuniary
damages for the loss of consortium due to a negligent injury to
his wife by a third person, but does not grant a corresponding
right under similar circumstances to a wife.
For example, D, while driving his automobile, negligently
runs over and injures W, the wife of H. By the great weight
of authority, H may bring an action and recover for his loss
of consortium due to the negligence of D, and prior recovery
by W, for the personal injuries she sustained will not preclude
H's recovery.'
However, a simple reversal of the injured parties in the
above set of facts will cause a different result. To illustrate, D,
in negligently operating his automobile runs over the husband
H instead of his wife W. D will be liable to H for the injuries
he sustained but it is well settled that W cannot maintain an
action for the loss of consortium she suffered due to the negli-
gence of D. 2
. It is apparent, therefore, that this lack of a corresponding
right on the part of the wife denotes something in the marital
status upon which the courts have seized to reach this incon-
sistent result. One explanation is that at common law the wife's
identity merged with that of her husband and they became one
person in law,3 the wife being unable to bring an action for
redress for injuries to her person or property without the joinder
of her husband.4 This loss, as a result of marriage, of the ability
to sue alone has been advanced as a reason for the absence of
1Commercial Carriers, Inc. et al. v. Small, 277 Ky. 189, 126 S.W.
2d 143 (1939); Brahan v. Meridian Light & Ry. Co., 121 Miss. 269,
83 So. 467 (1919); Matteson v. New York Central R.R., 35 N. Y. 487
(1866).
2 Fuller v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 21 F. Supp. 741
(1937); Hoagland v. L. & N. R. R., 195 Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922);
Maloy v. Foster, 169 Misc. 964, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 608 (1938).
'1 BL. Comm. *441.
1 BL. Comm. *442.
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decisions at early common law allowing a wife recovery for loss
of consortium.;
Another reason often presented for this absence of author-
ity is that, regardless of the procedural difficulty, there was no
substantive right in the wife at common law.6 2Nost courts have
followed this line of reasoning holding that the Married Women's
Acts, 7 while removing the procedural difficulty existing at
common law, create no new right in this instance, and therefore
deny the wife an action corresponding to the one allowed the
husband under similar circumstances. s
However, contrary to this reasoning, the wife has been
allowed an action under modern married women's acts for loss
of consortium in those cases where the act of the defendant is
wilful and intenti,onal.9 Thus, as in the case of Clark v. H171, 10
where the defendant drove the plaintiff's husband insane by
threats of violence, and in cases involving the widely recognized
actions of alienation of affections" and criminal conversation, 12
the courts have allowed the wife to maintain an action for loss
of consortium. In allowing recovery for intentional invasions
of the wife's consortium and denying it for negligent invasions,
the courts have attempted to justify their decisions upon two
grounds; first, that the damages caused by loss of consortium
are too remote and consequential ; 3 second, in the case of aliena-
Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium (1923)
22 MICH. L. REV. 1, at 2.
Ibid.
KY. R. S. (1944) 404.020.
'Hoagland v. L. & N. R.R., 195 Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922);
Nash v. Mobile & Ohio Ry., 149 Miss. 823, 116 So. 100 (1928); Bern-
hardt et al. v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S. W. 462 (1918).
'Clark v. Hill, 69 Mo. App. 541 (1897); Flandermeyer v. Cooper,
85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E. 102 (1912); Moberg v. Scott, 38 S.D. 422, 161
N.W. 998 (1917); see Commercial Carriers, Inc. et al. v. Small, 277
Ky. 189, 196, 126 S.W. 2d 143, 146 (1939); see Hoagland v. L. & N.
R.R., 195 Ky. 257, 264, 242 S.W. 628, 632 (1922); see Maloy v. Foster,
169 Misc. 964, 8 N.Y.S. 2d 608 (1938). 27 Am. JUR. 113; 13 R. C. L.
1444; Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations (1916)
14 MICH. L. REV. 177, at 195.
69 Mo. App. 541 (1897).
'Hudima v. Hudyma, 131 Conn. 281, 39 A. 2d 890 (1944); Deitz-
man v. Mullin, 108 Ky. 610, 57 S. W. 247 (1900).
"' Turner v. Heavrin, 182 Ky. 65, 206 S.W. 23 (1918); Woodman
v. Goodrich, 234 Wis. 565, 291 N.W. 768 (1940).
" Feneff v. New York Central & H. R. R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E.
436 (1909); Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 63 N.Y. Supp. 459
(1900); Kosciolek v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 81 Ore. 517,
160 Pac. 132 (1916).
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tion of affections and criminal conversation, the husband being
a particeps crimizis can bring no action and the recovery by the
wife will not result in double recovery.'
4
The first reason, as to the damages being too remote and
consequential, does not seem logical when, as pointed out above.
the courts allow an action to the wife where the injury is intcn-
tionial! Presumably in such cases the courts find no difficulty
in determining that the damages are not too remote or con-
sequential. This is an astounding inconsistency.
Also the courts have clearly established a contra result in
an action by the husband for ncgligent injiries to his wife.
Under the modern view of marriage there seems to ])e no basis
for this distinction between spouses,'5 for since the abrogation
of their common law unity,' 6 the increasing tendency has been
to place the husband and wife upon a plane of equality of rights.
Too, in an action by either spouse, the damages arise from an
injury to the right of consortium. This may be defined as a right
growing out of the marriage relation, shared by the husband
and wife alike, to the society, services, and companionship of
each other."7 Therefore, since remoteness is not a factor in con-
sidering the husband's recovery and the wife's cause of action
arises from an injury to the same right, reason dictates that this
is not a valid reason for the denial of the corresponding right to
the wife.
The second objection to allowing the wife recovery in negli-
gence actions is that where the husband has recovered for the
injuries he has sustained, a recovery by the wife for loss of con-
sortium would result in double recovery. Dean Emeritus Pound
has said, "The reason for not secu'ing the interest of the wife
. . . seems to be that our modes of trial are such and our mod-
of assessment of damages by the verdict of a jury is necessarily
so crude that if husband and wife were each allowed to sue,
instead of each recovering an exact reparation, each woul ldbe
" Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. 1, 18 Atl. 1027 (1889); Turner v. Heav-
rin, 182 Ky. 65, 206 S.W. 23 (1918).
'"Martin v. Robson, 65 Ill. 129 (1872).
'Ky. R. S. (1944) 404.020.
'"Marri v. Stamford Street R.R., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911);
Feneff v. New York Central & H. R. R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N. E. 436
(1909); Guevin v. Manchester Street Ry., 78 N. H. 289, 99 AtI. 298
(1916).
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pretty sure to recover what would repair the injury to both. ''is
This criticism seems equally applicable to both husband and
wife, yet the courts use it to deny the wife recovery' 9 and do
not apply it to a like action by the husband. Why should it
apply to one of the spouses and not the other? There seems to
lie nio valid reason unless it is a historic survivor of the law that
(.,Insidered the wife to be inferior.2" Only one decision has
allowed the wife to recover in negligence actions, 21 while a few
courts have recognized the unjust inconsistency and in attempt-
ing to solve it. have denied recovery to both husband and wife.
22
This latter solution would seem correct if Pound's criticism,
.supiet. were well founded, but neithdr the question of double re-
,.overy, or the solution seems to be proper when one realizes that
there are two separate and distinct injuries to two different
1,uiple. Each injury is substantial. The person who negligently
injuries one spouse cannot avoid the result of a loss of consortium
t, thfe other spouse, this being an injury of prime importance,
as ,-onsortium is the very essence of marriage. Such an injury
sbhoull not )o without redress of pecuniary reparation to the
lpersin sIl injured.
Therefore, since precedents have established that both the
husbanil and wife can recover for loss of consortium where the
injnry is iMnhat -m il; since the hiusband can recover for loss of
.ius,ortiiII where the injury is negligent, and since the reasons
for not alliwing the wife a like recovery in similar eases are
basel upon g-roundless distinctions, it is concluded that the wife
shiuld ihe allowed an action for loss of consortium due to the
nve'ligtent injury of her husband.
JoHN .MORRow KINNAIRD
"Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations (1916)
14 MICH. L. REV. 177, at 194.
"'Giggey v. Gallagher Transportation Co. et al., 101 Colo. 258,
72 P. 2d 1100 (1937).
" 3 BL. COMI. :143.
-' Hipp v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 182 N. C. 9, 108 S. E.
318 (1921).
Contra: Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N. C. 120, 126
S. E. 307 (1924).
-'Marri v. Stamford Street R. R., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911)
(Based on interpretation of a statute): Bolger v. Boston Elevated
Ry., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910). See Note (1922) 21 A.L.R.
1517, at 1527.
